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Abstract 
An Agricultural Sector Model is used to determine the economic potential of 
agricultural greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies within hypothetical emission 
mitigation markets. For a complete set of agricultural land management decisions, 
emissions and emission reductions of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide are 
accounted for and simultaneously subjected to a wide range of carbon prices. The 
estimated, competitive emission abatement supply functions for major agricultural 
strategies are contrasted with two other commonly used measures of abatement potential: 
single strategy economic potential and technical potential. Specific agricultural 
production and market characteristics that further impact agriculture’s mitigation 
potential are discussed. 
 
Key words: greenhouse gas emission mitigation market, Agricultural Sector Model, 
economic potential, environmental policy design, non-point source, cropland 
heterogeneity, transaction cost, emission leakage. 
 
  
 
HARVESTING THE GREENHOUSE THROUGH  
ALTERED LAND MANAGEMENT: ECONOMIC POTENTIAL  
AND MARKET DESIGN CHALLENGES 
 
 
 Carbon sequestration in agricultural and forest soils as well as in standing trees has 
received substantial attention within the policy, energy, and agriculture and forestry (AF) 
communities. Expanded concern arises from a combination of six principal forces: 
1.  Greenhouse gas (GHG) links to projected climate change  
2.  International agreements as manifest in the Kyoto Protocol  
3.  International pressures to reduce emissions  
4.  High-cost emission offsets in other sectors of the economy 
5. Congruence of carbon sequestration activities with other AF-related societal 
desires like water quality and income distribution 
6. Potential emergence of a GHG offset market   
This interest is beginning to stimulate U.S. policy action, with bills being introduced 
in Congress and discussions in both environmental and agricultural agencies regarding 
policy and/or program design. Many factors need to be considered in formulating 
appropriate policy and programs. Substantial literature is emerging regarding soil science 
and forest management aspects of and potential for carbon sequestration (see Lal et al. 
1998; Follett, Kimble, and Lal 2001; and IPCC 1996, 2000, and 2001). However, while 
this interest is founded in the technical potential that AF might generate, the real degree 
to which AF producers might meaningfully participate depends on key economic and 
market implementation issues. In this paper we will examine such potential, exploring 
economic potential for AF participation in a GHG market, and characteristics of AF GHG 
emission offsets that must be accommodated in market design to achieve meaningful AF 
participation. 
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Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation in Agriculture and Forestry:  
Concept and Technical Potential 
 Before discussing economic and market implementation issues, we will briefly 
review the mechanisms through which AF can participate, as well as the magnitude of the 
technical estimates for participation potential. Following the arguments in McCarl and 
Schneider (1999, 2000), AF may mitigate GHG emissions by  
· creating or expanding sinks to enhance terrestrial absorption of atmospheric 
GHGs (carbon sequestration); 
· reducing GHG emissions generated during AF operations; and 
· providing products that substitute for GHG-intensive products and thereby 
displace emissions. 
Each of these points will be discussed below. 
Carbon Sequestration 
 Atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) buildup is an important forcing agent behind 
projected climate change (Schlesinger 2001; North 2001; IPCC 1996, 2001). Terrestrial 
carbon sequestration offers a possible way of reducing concentrations. Carbon dioxide is 
exchanged continuously between the terrestrial biosphere and the atmosphere. 
Chlorophyllic plants absorb carbon dioxide through photosynthesis and use the contained 
carbon to build organic matter. Thus, carbon directly accumulates as plants grow. At the 
end of plant life, most of the organic carbon is quickly released to the atmosphere through 
microbial decomposition or through combustion. However, some of the carbon enters 
other terrestrial pools (humus, wooden furniture, and others).  
Scientists estimate that about 80 percent of global carbon is stored in soils or forests 
(IPCC 2000) and that a substantial proportion of the carbon originally contained in soils and 
forests has been released due to past AF activities and deforestation. Collectively, these facts 
imply that there is substantial potential for AF activities to sequester carbon (Lal et al. 1998).  
There are two fundamental physical processes through which carbon sequestration 
can be enhanced: increasing the amount of carbon accumulated in soils or trees and 
decreasing microbial decomposition and combustion (IPPC 1996; Paustian et al. 2001). 
Management actions that increase soil and tree carbon storage include expanding forested 
areas, delaying the time of forest harvest, increasing forest growth rates through enhanced 
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silvicultural practices, adopting agricultural practices that minimize soil disturbance and 
erosion, increasing retention of crop or logging residue, and maximizing water- and 
nutrient-use efficiency of crop production.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and leading U.S. physical 
scientists have estimated the technical potential of such practices (Table 1). With a 
projected U.S. Kyoto Accord target in the neighborhood of 700 million metric tons 
(MMT),1 these estimates suggest that there is technical potential for sequestration activities 
to cover a large share of the U.S. obligation. 
Emission Reductions 
The IPCC (1996) estimates that on a global basis, agriculture emits about 50 percent 
of all methane, 70 percent of all nitrous oxide, and 20 percent of all carbon dioxide. 
Methane (CH4) is emitted in AF through enteric fermentation of ruminant animals, 
anaerobic livestock manure decomposition, rice cultivation, and termites. Possible 
abatement strategies include altering crop choice, livestock herd size, livestock feeding 
and rearing practices, and manure management. Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions arise 
from manure, legumes, and fertilizer use and can be abated by reducing livestock herd 
size and changing crop mixes and fertilization practices. Carbon dioxide is emitted from 
fossil fuel usage, mineralization of soil organic matter, deforestation, and biomass 
decomposition or burning. Emissions can be reduced by decreasing production fuel use; 
 
TABLE 1. Estimate of global potential contribution to change in carbon stocks by 
source (in million metric tons of carbon per year) 
Source 
IPCC 2000 
Global Estimate U.S. Estimate 
Cropland management 125 75-208 (Lal et al.) 
Grazing land management 240 29.5-110 (Follett, Kimble, and Lal.) 
Forest management 170 
Agroforestry 26 
Afforestation 390 
300 (Birdsey)a 
Cropland to grassland 38 6-14 (Lal et al.) 
Wetland restoration 4  
Degraded land restoration 3 11-25 (Lal et al.) 
a This estimate arose from the U.S. Cop 6 negotiating position for annual sequestration by forests under 
business as usual without additional incentives (UNFCCC 2000). 
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changing the allocation of land among crops, pasture, grass lands, and forests; increasing 
forest harvest intervals; improving crop residue management; and restoring degraded 
land. Forest management practices that reduce emissions include diminished 
deforestation or logging, protection of forest reserves, and improved disturbance 
management with respect to fire and pest outbreaks. 
The relative magnitude of these emission sources varies substantially across 
countries, with the greatest differences occurring between developing and developed 
countries. Deforestation and land degradation mainly occur in developing countries while 
developed countries slightly increase their forest base (FAO 1997). Developed country 
agriculture generally uses more capital-intensive production systems,2 resulting in higher 
fossil-fuel-based emissions.  
Product Substitution 
AF biomass products may replace fossil-fuel-intensive products such as electrical 
power and liquid fuels. The use of biomass energy mitigates carbon dioxide emissions 
because most of the carbon released at combustion time is recycled carbon. Kline, 
Hargrove, and Vanderlan, for example, estimate that only 5 percent of the carbon emitted 
through poplar-fed electrical power plants pertains to fossil fuels. The remaining 95 
percent pertains to carbon photosynthetically absorbed from the atmosphere during 
biomass growth. Use of pure fossil fuel products, on the other hand, increases 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations by 100 percent of the contained carbon 
dioxide plus emissions related to extraction and processing of these fuels.  
Forestry products also can be used as substitutes for fossil-fuel-intensive steel and 
concrete in construction (Marland and Schlamadinger [1997]; Brown [1999]; and Brown 
et al. [1996] elaborate on this point). Finally, there may be gains from substituting cotton 
and other fibers for petroleum-based synthetics. 
 
Economic Potential  
An appraisal of the economic potential for AF-generated GHG offsets entails four 
important matters, some of which we consider here and some of which we leave for 
future research. These include 
· factors that would cause an AF producer to adopt a strategy, 
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· appropriate appraisal scope, 
· competition across alternative strategies, and 
· multi-gas trade-offs. 
After discussing each, we will provide empirical data on economic potential. 
Agricultural and Forestry Producer Adoption 
While policymakers and others may desire certain GHG offset practices to be used in 
AF, the farm or forest operator ultimately controls the practices employed. Farmers and 
foresters adopt those practices that maximize their well-being. Well-being, however, is a 
complex good involving many dimensions, such as 
· practice profitability, 
· risk and uncertainty,  
· time availability of resources required to use the practice,  
· amount of training and/or learning required to employ the practice,  
· willingness to adopt the degree of management required to employ the practice,  
· consistency of the practice with existing equipment complement,  
· willingness and ability to invest in new equipment required to employ the 
practice, 
· desire for environmental stewardship coupled with the environmental attributes 
of practice, and  
· necessity to perform in compliance with imposed regulations. 
Some practices currently used by farmers and foresters are desirable from a GHG 
emission mitigation point of view. In such cases, the operator has judged the practice 
superior to other alternatives, even in the absence of adoption incentives. However, in 
other cases the desired practices are not used. To convince farmers to adopt such 
practices, regulations or incentives are needed. The incentives may be a mixture of direct 
instruments (such as carbon-related payments) and indirect instruments (such as 
sequestration shortfall insurance, investment subsidies, and training programs). 
Consider for example the adoption of no-till farming as opposed to conventional 
moldboard plowing. Discussions with farmers (see Bennett 1999) reveal reservations 
about the adoption of no-till due to factors such as 
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· potential yield losses due to slower warming of untilled soils during cool spring 
planting seasons;  
· potential yield reductions due to other factors; 
· potential cost increases, particularly for weed and insect control;  
· need to acquire new expensive equipment; 
· critical reliance on the effectiveness of chemical weed control compounds and 
the need for continued efficacy of weed control; 
· learning time to effectively employ the practice; and 
· willingness on behalf of older farmers to switch practices. 
 
All of these factors affect the magnitude of the financial incentives required to 
stimulate adoption. A lower bound on the needed incentive could be calculated as the 
foregone net income due to average yield loss (note yield gains are possible) plus the net 
value of any cost change. In developing efficient policies, however, incentives above and 
beyond lost income may be needed to overcome other barriers to adoption. Babcock et al., 
for example, indicate that nominally profitable practices may not always result in full 
adoption. 
Appropriate Appraisal Scope 
Appraisal scope is an important factor when considering the potential role of AF 
activities for GHG emission mitigation. The economic potential can be appraised at the 
field, farm, regional, or sector level. Farm-level assessments may report the incentives 
needed to induce participation on individual parcels. However, such appraisal results are 
based on current prices and thus may be misleading. The following small calculation will 
illustrate why AF GHG mitigation efforts might substantially impact market prices for 
traditional AF commodities. U.S. cropland amounts to approximately 325 million acres. 
The literature suggests an annual maximum potential for agricultural carbon sinks of 
around one and a half tons of carbon per acre of cropland through afforestation (Newell 
and Stavins). As a result, the total annual agricultural-cropland-based contribution to 
carbon storage may be bounded at about 325 million tons. The annual U.S. provisions of 
the Kyoto Protocol, however, likely would be in the neighborhood of 700 million tons. 
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Given the relatively high demand for emission reductions, large amounts of 
traditional cropland would be diverted to forests or biofuel production if these 
agricultural mitigation strategies were more cost efficient than strategies from other 
sectors. Large crop acreage reductions, however, would imply similar reductions in crop 
production, leading to higher market prices. Higher market prices for traditional AF 
commodities would raise the opportunity cost of mitigation strategies and thus make AF 
mitigation more expensive the more cropland is involved. To account for these complex 
interactions, a sector-level approach that simultaneously analyzes mitigation impacts and 
impacts on the traditional agricultural sector is needed. 
Competition Across Alternative Strategies 
The economic and technical potentials of certain AF GHG emission mitigation 
strategies are not independent of the level of other strategies. For example, the more 
cropland farmers allocate to biofuels, the less cropland is available for establishing 
permanent forests or adopting friendly tillage practices. Complementary relationships 
also emerge; farmers may supply corn for ethanol processing and at the same time 
sequester soil carbon through minimum tillage and offset emissions by reducing fossil 
fuel usage. Thus, simultaneous consideration of potential strategies rather than 
independent appraisal would appear to be appropriate. 
Multiple Gas Trade-offs 
AF enterprises contribute to emissions of multiple GHGs. A crop-livestock farm 
releases carbon dioxide when combusting the fuel necessary to operate field machinery, 
emits nitrous oxide through fertilizer applications, releases methane through enteric 
fermentation from ruminant animals or as a manure by-product, but possibly augments 
the soil carbon stock by using reduced tillage. Trade-offs between these emissions may 
occur if, for example, more fertilizer is needed under reduced tillage or if usage of growth 
hormones for animals alters the required acreage to produce feed.  
Multiple gases can be considered using the global warming potential (GWP) 
concept. The GWP compares the radiative force of the various GHGs relative to carbon 
dioxide over a given time (IPCC 1996). The one-hundred-year GWP for carbon dioxide 
equals 1. Higher values for methane (21) and nitrous oxide (310) reflect a greater heat-
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trapping ability. Thus, multiplying an emission quantity by the GWP forms a “carbon 
equivalent” measure after factoring in an adjustment for the molecular weight of carbon 
in carbon dioxide. 
 
Economic Potential: Empirical Findings 
Now we turn our attention to economic estimates of potential, although we do not 
have a full accounting of the disincentives that are not profit related. 
Methodology 
Following McCarl and Schneider (2001) we use AF sector modeling to estimate the 
economic potential for GHG mitigation under different farmer-received carbon prices 
(i.e., market prices less brokerage fees and other transactions costs). At each hypothetical 
carbon price, our model solves for the new AF sector market equilibrium. The volumes of 
induced GHG net emission reductions as well as other impacts are computed as the 
deviation from the zero carbon price baseline equilibrium. Our analysis simultaneously 
considers the full spectrum of U.S.-based AF responses to a net greenhouse gas 
mitigation effort, thus taking into account the complex, interrelated nature of activities in 
the AF sectors. For example, use of a biofuel mitigation strategy could alter corn 
production and corn prices, which in turn may impact exports, livestock diets, livestock 
herd size, and manure production as well as land allocation to biofuels and forests. The 
mitigation strategies involved are summarized in Table 2 and are defined in Schneider.  
Our model is a new version of the U.S. Agricultural Sector Model (ASM) (McCarl et 
al. 2001, Chang et al. 1992). It is a mathematical programming based, price-endogenous 
sector model of the agricultural sector, modified to include GHG emissions accounting 
by Schneider (2000), and hereafter called ASMGHG. Recently ASMGHG has been 
expanded to include data from a forestry sector model (Adams et al. 1996; Alig, Adams, 
and McCarl 1998). ASMGHG depicts production, consumption, and international trade 
in 63 U.S. regions for 22 traditional and 3 designated energy crops, 29 animal products, 
and more than 60 processed agricultural products.  
Environmental impacts include levels of GHG emission or absorption for carbon 
dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide; surface, subsurface, and groundwater pollution for 
nitrogen and phosphorous; and soil erosion. ASMGHG simulates the market and trade  
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TABLE 2. Mitigation strategies included in the analysis 
Greenhouse Gas Affected Strategy Basic Nature CO2 CH4 N2O 
Afforestation/timberland 
 management 
Sequestration X   
Biofuel production Offset X X X 
Crop mix alteration  Emission, sequestration X  X 
Crop fertilization alteration Emission, sequestration X  X 
Crop input alteration Emission X  X 
Crop tillage alteration Emission X  X 
Grassland conversion  Sequestration X   
Irrigated/dry land conversion Emission X  X 
Livestock management  Emission  X  
Livestock herd size alteration Emission  X X 
Livestock production system 
 substitution Emission  X X 
Manure management Emission  X  
Rice acreage  Emission  X  
 
equilibrium in agricultural markets of the United States and 28 major foreign trading 
partners. Domestic and foreign supply and demand conditions are considered, as are 
regional production conditions and resource endowments. The market equilibrium reveals 
commodity and factor prices, levels of domestic production, export and import quantities, 
GHG emissions management strategy adoption, resource usage, and environmental 
impact indicators. We solved ASMGHG repeatedly for carbon prices ranging from $0 to 
$500 per ton of carbon equivalent (TCE). 
Estimates of Economic Potential: Results 
Scientific evidence and the number of inquiries regarding AF GHG mitigation are 
growing rapidly. The data underlying this study, while the best available to us as at this 
time, will be old and obsolete tomorrow and could be improved by substantial efforts 
today. Consequently, we will not concentrate on specific empirical results. Rather, we 
will highlight general findings that we believe are highly relevant to consideration of the 
potential for AF sequestration and, to the extent possible, that rise above the flaws in the 
underlying data. 
Cost Effectiveness of Emission Reductions 
Figure 1 shows the amount of carbon equivalent emissions abated at carbon prices 
ranging from $0 to $500 by broad category of strategy. Low-cost strategies primarily 
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involve soil carbon sequestration and, to some extent, afforestation, fertilization, and manure 
management. Up to a total of about 400 million metric tons of carbon equivalent 
(MMTCE) can be offset through AF (Table 3). To place cost estimates in perspective, one 
could contrast our findings to Weyant and Hill’s (1999) multi-model study of non-
agricultural Kyoto compliance costs sponsored by the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF). 
Across EMF studies, abatement costs vary with assumptions on emissions trading and 
baseline emissions. In the presence of carbon emissions trading among Annex I regions, U.S. 
abatement costs were generally in the range of $50 to $100 per metric ton of carbon but 
reached as high as $227. The costs of achieving particular GHG emission reduction levels 
were much higher without international trade in carbon emissions rights. 
Effective Emissions Mitigation Strategies  
Many different GHG emission (GHGE) mitigating agricultural strategies are possible 
and a number are often individually advocated. Our results indicate that a portfolio of 
strategies appears appropriate. Figure 1 shows the usage of the major mitigation 
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FIGURE 1. Agricultural mitigation potential at $0 to $500 per ton carbon 
equivalent prices 
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TABLE 3. Results at selected carbon price scenarios 
Carbon Equivalent Price in $/Metric Ton C Category 
 
 Subcategory 10 20 50 100 200 500 
Strategy contribution (1,000 TCE) 
 Ag-soil sequestration  44,563 57,074 70,538 63,369 53,785 58,268 
 Afforestation 4,028 13,445 49,957 59,407 133,380 183,283 
 Biofuel offsets 0 0 20,799 112,790 149,337 132,424 
 Fossil fuel ag-inputs 2,575 3,849 5,326 6,965 8,690 10,738 
 Animal CH4 + N2O -13 204 4,131 8,680 11,508 18,579 
 Crop CH4 + N2O 1,037 1,210 1,655 2,829 4,042 5,053 
GHGE mitigation contribution (MMTCE) 
 C 0.1 0.3 4.5 12.2 15.9 20.4 
 CH4 51.2 74.4 145.8 237.9 339.1 379.4 
 N2O 0.9 1.1 2.2 4.0 5.7 8.6 
 CE 52.2 75.8 152.4 254.0 360.7 408.3 
Agricultural market effects (Fisher Index) 
 U.S. crop production 99.2 98.5 95.7 86.3 74.0 65.5 
 U.S. crop prices 100.8 102.0 108.1 129.1 169.8 256.5 
 U.S. crop exports 97.4 94.8 87.1 59.2 29.1 23.1 
 U.S. livestock production 100.3 100.1 97.4 92.9 88.1 77.9 
 U.S. livestock prices 100.1 100.5 104.8 119.1 144.4 195.8 
Non-GHG environmental impacts (percent-per-acre change) 
 Wind and water erosion -23.8 -31.3 -42.3 -44.4 -50.7 -49.9 
 N loss through percolation -7.2 -9.7 -15.6 -19.1 -19.5 -12.7 
 N loss in subsurface flow -8.7 -9.9 -11.7 -9.8 -7.1 -5.1 
 P loss in sediment -32.6 -40.7 -50.4 -49.6 -52.0 -50.9 
 
 
strategies over the total range of carbon prices. The results show a role for biofuels, 
forests, agricultural soils, methane, and nitrous-oxide-based strategies. Different 
strategies take on different degrees of relative importance depending on the carbon price 
level. While soil carbon sequestration peaks at around $50 per ton carbon, biofuel offsets 
are not competitive for prices below $30 per ton.  
Sole reliance on agricultural soil carbon (Figure 2, economic potential line) reduces, 
for example, 60 MMT carbon at $30 per ton while consideration of the total portfolio 
achieves the same reduction at a cost between $10 and $20 per ton (Table 3). 
Technical, Economic, and Competitive Economic Potential 
Contrasting technical, economic, and competitive economic potential can illustrate 
the impact of economics on GHG emission mitigation potential in AF. We graph such a 
contrast for three major strategies: agricultural soil carbon sequestration (Figure 2),  
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FIGURE 2. Agricultural soil carbon, technical, sole-source economic, and competitive 
economic response 
carbon absorbed through afforestation (Figure 3), and carbon abated through energy 
crops (Figure 4). Estimates of technical potential ignore cost and resource competition 
and show that, if fully pursued, one could offset about 150 MMTCE annually with 
agricultural soil carbon sequestration from crop and pasture lands, about 270 MMTCE 
with afforestation, and about 330 MMTCE from energy-crop-related mitigation.  
 However, sole reliance on technical potential does not give a clear picture of 
implementation potential. Rather, the cost of achieving particular levels must also be 
considered. Agricultural soil carbon sequestration is the cheapest mitigation strategy for 
realizing about 50 percent of the technical potential for a relatively low carbon price of 
$50 per TCE. Biofuel crops and afforestation are more expensive to implement, but their 
ultimate technical potential is larger than that for agricultural soil carbon sequestration. 
At $50 per TCE, the economic potential for these two options ranges between 10 and 20 
percent of their technical potential. It takes carbon prices as high as $300 per TCE for 
biofuel-crop-related carbon offsets to get close to the technical potential.  
Competition between different mitigation strategies is also important and is 
illustrated through the difference between economic potential and competitive economic 
potential. For example, if growing biofuel crops were the only mitigation option  
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FIGURE 3. Afforestation carbon sink, technical, sole-source economic, and 
competitive economic response 
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FIGURE 4. Carbon offsets from energy crops, technical, sole-source economic, and 
competitive economic response 
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(economic potential), about 192 MMTCE could be abated annually at a carbon price of 
$200 per TCE. If other options were considered simultaneously (competitive economic 
potential), the contribution of biofuel crops would diminish to about 133 MMTCE or by 
about 30 percent due to competition for land and other resources. The afforestation sink 
exhibits a similar pattern. In case of agricultural soil carbon sequestration, however, 
competition among strategies leads to a declining abatement contribution for carbon 
prices above $50 per TCE because the other strategies are dominant in that range, 
diverting land and demanding more intensification, which leads to a greater tillage 
intensity. This behavior demonstrates that higher carbon prices do not necessarily 
increase the GHG mitigation contribution of all strategies. 
Impacts of Adoption on Environmental Quality 
Many of the proposed agricultural mitigation actions (e.g., tillage intensity reduction, 
manure management, and land retirement) have long been discussed as strategies that 
simultaneously improve environmental quality. Consequently, one may expect benefits in 
such areas as erosion control and nutrient runoff, which are created simultaneously with 
emissions abatement. Table 3 lists changes in a few selected environmental parameters as 
carbon equivalent prices increase. For the most part, rates of nitrogen and phosphorous 
runoff and erosion decline. Environmental co-benefits largely stabilize at prices around 
$50 per ton. Higher carbon prices increase biofuel acreage at the expense of traditional 
crop production. As prices for traditional crops go up, intensive crop production becomes 
more profitable, but maintaining yield-reducing mitigation strategies becomes more 
costly. Thus, for carbon prices above $200 per ton we encounter a mixed environmental 
response from the traditional crop sector. Total traditional acreage declines, but emissions 
per acre partially increase. 
 
Characteristics of Agriculture and Forestry Greenhouse Gas Markets 
Economic and technical potentials are not the sole predictors of whether AF GHG 
mitigating strategies will be important. In order for AF GHG credits to be sold to a 
potential buyer, three major cost components must be overcome. Namely, compensation 
must offset 
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1.  cost to adopt a practice as discussed above; 
2.  transaction costs borne by the producer to sell the commodity (Stavins 1995), 
including any costs of required monitoring and verification that has to be under-
taken by the producer; and 
3.  costs accruing to market intermediaries for assembling, marketing, and certifying 
net emission reduction quantities. 
If, however, the sector receives subsidies from farm programs or other environmental 
initiatives because of co-benefits that are generated by the AF GHG policies, then these 
payments will offset some of the costs. 
To date, quantitative analysis of only the first of the three cost categories has been 
explored in depth as discussed above. The remaining costs and the issue of co-benefits 
are likely to be much more complicated. The reason for this is that markets for GHG 
credits, particularly those associated with AF, will face a number of unique challenges. 
Even when compared with other environmental markets, such as the sulfur dioxide case, 
AF GHG markets will face enormous challenges (Stavins 1998, 2000). There are (at 
least) eight characteristics of AF GHG markets that make such markets particularly 
problematic. 
Non-point source. Emissions and sequestration are geographically widespread. 
Quantifying credits and monitoring compliance monitoring will likely require some mix 
of mobile efforts, sampling, computer modeling, and remote sensing. These costs must be 
borne by either the market participants or market intermediaries.  
Cost heterogeneity. Implementation costs and resultant emission mitigation 
quantities vary geographically, even for the same strategy. Differentiating factors include 
land-use history, soil and climate conditions, and various others. Certification and 
incentive programs need to recognize this diversity to provide incentives where they are 
most likely to generate the greatest benefit per dollar. 
Targeting. Designing programs to address problems concerning non-point source 
and cost heterogeneity is difficult. However, society has been designing and refining 
approaches to soil erosion and forest improvement incentives for more that 50 years in 
programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program. Offset market designers may wish 
to review approaches used in soil erosion, water quality markets, and wetlands markets in 
setting up rules and market practices for carbon markets.  
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Permanence. Soil and forest sinks saturate. Payments may be needed to retain the 
sequestered carbon after saturation. McCarl and Murray conducted a net present value 
analysis on tillage-change-induced soil carbon gains. They found soil carbon to be worth 
one-half or less relative to an equivalent amount of sustainable emissions offsets. Grading 
standards may be needed to adjust for saturation rates across strategies. 
Leakage. Actions in one place cause reactions elsewhere so that less production here 
implies more elsewhere. McCarl (1998) examined afforestation incentives, finding that 
large-scale conversions of farmland into forestland causes large counter movements of 
existing forestland into farmland. These unintended land conversions offset close to 50 
percent of the carbon gained from afforestation. Grading standards may be needed to 
adjust for differential leakage potential across strategies. 
Costs of market intermediaries. It is anticipated that the primary purchasers of credits 
in a CO2 credit market would be large sources such as power plants. AF sellers, on the 
other hand, may be made up of many small farmers and foresters. Assuming a one-third 
ton per acre carbon potential, the purchase of one 100,000-ton lot of carbon mitigation 
credits would require assembling, monitoring, and verifying performance across 300,000 
acres or about 500 square miles. This task would involve about 600 producers, given an 
average farm size of 500 acres. If such a market is to succeed, brokers will be needed to 
negotiate between buyers and sellers. Assembly and coordination costs would not be 
trivial. Alston and Hurd (1990) estimate the costs of distributing deficiency and loan rate 
payments to be about 40 percent of the money distributed. The size of these transaction 
costs could exclude small acreage producers.  
Sweetening returns to reflect co-benefits. Many AFS strategies generate co-benefits. 
Some strategies improve water quality or create more favorable patterns of rural income. 
Public subsidies or other environmental markets may exist or could be developed that favor 
strategies that generate co-benefits. These co-benefits would influence the optimal mix of 
AF policies and must be taken into account in designing markets for AF GHG mitigation.  
Property rights and existing practices. Some producers already employ certain 
mitigation practices and therefore have already created a stock of carbon in their soil and 
forest stocks. This sequestered carbon could be released if the producer reverts back to 
traditional practices. What incentives should be created to ensure the continued 
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sequestration of existing stocks of carbon? The answer to this question has complicated 
implications for both equity and efficiency.  
If a market-based approach to mitigating GHGs is to succeed, each of the issues 
noted above must be addressed. Moreover, the good that is transacted in environmental 
markets is defined by the regulations that create the market. Depending on how the rules 
are written, the resulting market can look like that for commodities traded on the Chicago 
Board of Trade, or like the market for used cars advertised in the local newspaper 
(Woodward and Kaiser 2000). However, it should not be assumed that a more efficient 
market is necessarily “better.” Efforts to increase market efficiency may directly conflict 
with the need to monitor non-point sources, accommodate heterogeneity, account for 
leakage and permanence, and recognize co-benefits. The greatest challenge for such 
markets may be finding a way to balance the need to create the appropriate incentives for 
each AF producer with the competing need to create a market that is not overburdened by 
transaction costs. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Agriculture and forestry offer the potential to mitigate a significant quantity of 
greenhouse gases through direct emissions reductions, biofuel offsets, and carbon 
sequestration involving trees, land use change, and tillage change. However, practical 
economic potential is smaller than technical potential. Furthermore, a number of market 
design issues must be worked out to manage program transaction costs and place 
agricultural activities on an even footing with non-agricultural activities. We firmly 
believe that future agriculture and forestry producers will operate in a society that values 
GHG emission reductions and that these values will be expressed through markets and 
price signals. Determining how to best design those markets and predicting their real 
potential are important tasks for future research. 
  
Endnotes 
1 The Kyoto Protocol would require the United States to limit net emissions to 1990 levels less 7 percent 
(UNFCCC) between 2008 and 2012. Using Environmental Protection Agency emissions inventory data 
(EPA 2000), such an agreement would imply annual carbon emission reductions of about 300 million tons 
relative to 1990 plus offsets for emissions growth by 2010 (which by linear extrapolation is around 400 
million more tons), for a total in the neighborhood of 700 million tons. 
2 Aggregate estimates of tractor inventory show developed countries using about three times as many 
tractors as developing countries on an agricultural area that is 40 percent smaller (FAO 1999).
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